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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case presents a matter of first impression: 
whether, within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(the “FLSA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 203 et. seq., an employer 
must treat bonuses provided by third parties as “remuneration 
for employment” when calculating employees’ overtime rate 
of pay.   
 
 Under the FLSA’s overtime provisions, id. § 207, 
employers must pay employees one-and-a-half times their 
“regular rate” of pay for all hours worked above a forty-hour 
work week.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a).  “[R]egular rate” is defined 
as including “all remuneration for employment paid to, or on 
behalf of, the employee,” subject to eight enumerated 
exemptions.  Id. § 207(e)(1)-(8).  But “remuneration for 
employment” is not defined in the overtime provisions or 
elsewhere in the Act. 
 
The Department of Labor, despite decades of 
enforcing the FLSA, has only recently discovered in that 80-
year-old statute a basis for asserting that employers are bound 
to include bonuses from third parties in the regular rate of pay 
when calculating overtime pay, regardless of what the 
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employer and employee may have agreed.  This case thus 
asks us whether the expectations of employers and employees 
are made irrelevant by a novel statutory interpretation and a 
new enforcement strategy by the Department of Labor. 
 
The District Court, agreeing with the position of the 
Department of Labor, concluded that the incentive bonuses at 
issue here must be included in the regular rate of pay because 
they are remuneration for employment and do not qualify for 
any of the statutory exemptions.  We disagree that all 
incentive bonuses provided by third parties are necessarily 
“remuneration for employment” under the Act and therefore 
properly included in the regular rate of pay when calculating 
overtime pay.  Instead, we hold that incentive bonuses 
provided by third parties may or may not be remuneration for 
employment, depending on the understanding of the employer 
and employee.  In this case, the factual record does not 
support a finding that all of the incentive bonuses were 
necessarily remuneration for employment.  We will therefore 
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand in part for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Bristol Excavating Inc. (“Bristol”) is a small 
excavation contractor, owned and operated by Calvin Bristol, 
the sole proprietor.  Talisman Energy Inc. (“Talisman”) is a 
large natural gas production company with active drill pads in 
Pennsylvania.  Bristol entered into a master service agreement 
with Talisman to provide equipment, labor, and other services 
at Talisman drilling sites.  Due to the nature of the business, 
Bristol employees at those sites put in extensive overtime 
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hours, working shifts of twelve-and-one-half-hours daily for 
two-week periods before having a week off.   
 
At some point, Bristol employees became aware of a 
bonus program sponsored by Talisman (the “Talisman 
Bonuses”), which was offered to all workers at its drilling 
sites, including employees of contractors.  The program 
rewarded employees with distinct bonuses for safety, for 
efficiency, and for completion of work, the last being called 
the “Pacesetter” bonus.   
 
Bristol’s employees asked Bristol if they, like other 
workers at the sites, could receive the Talisman Bonuses.  
Bristol in turn posed the question to Talisman, which said 
yes.  Bristol then agreed to undertake the clerical work 
necessary for its employees to receive the bonuses.  Talisman 
emailed Bristol when workers at a particular site had earned a 
bonus, and Bristol identified whether any Bristol employees 
were working at that site, submitted invoices for the bonuses 
to Talisman for payment, accepted bonus payments from 
Talisman, deducted taxes and other costs and fees, and 
distributed the bonus payments to its employees.  Bristol and 
Talisman, however, never added the bonus arrangement to 
their master service agreement, and neither Bristol nor 
Talisman entered into a formal contract with Bristol’s 
employees with respect to the bonuses.  Of particular 
relevance now, Bristol did not include the Talisman Bonuses 
in the regular rate of pay when calculating overtime 
compensation for its employees. 
 
An auditor from the Department of Labor visited 
Bristol’s offices as part of a routine inspection to assure 
Bristol was properly calculating overtime compensation.  
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Following that inspection, the auditor determined that the 
Talisman-paid bonuses must be added in the calculation of 
the Bristol employees’ regular rate of pay.  The Department 
of Labor endorsed that determination and, as a consequence 
of Bristol’s decision to allow employees to receive the 
Talisman Bonuses, the Department insisted that Bristol pay 
for overtime at a higher rate.  When Bristol refused, the 
Department filed this suit, alleging that Bristol violated the 
FLSA’s overtime provisions.   
 
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, 
which the District Court1 resolved in a single order, granting 
the Department’s motion for summary judgment and denying 
Bristol’s motion for summary judgment.2  The Court 
concluded that Bristol violated the FLSA’s overtime 
provisions by failing to include the Talisman Bonuses in the 
“regular rate” and that the violations are subject to the 
statute’s mandatory liquidated damages provision, but the 
                                                 
1  The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the 
magistrate judge.  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Upon the 
consent of the parties, a … United States magistrate judge … 
may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil 
matter and order the entry of judgment in the case[.])   
2  The District Court’s order declared that the 
Department of Labor’s motion for summary judgment was 
“granted in part” (App. at 21), but the Court resolved all of 
the Department’s claims.  Although injunctive relief was 
denied, there was no further action to be taken, so the order 
was final.  Neither party argues otherwise, and the judgment 
is now ripe for review. 
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Court denied the Department’s request for injunctive relief.  
Bristol timely appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION3 
 
On appeal, Bristol continues to argue that the District 
Court erred in concluding that the Talisman Bonuses should 
be included in the “regular rate.”  Bristol contends the 
bonuses were not remuneration for employment or, in the 
alternative, that they qualified for a statutory exemption.  The 
Department of Labor responds by arguing that “[t]he 
payments are indisputably remuneration for employment … 
because they are payments made to Bristol’s employees that 
are directly tied to the hours and quality of work that the 
employees performed for Bristol.”  (Answering Br. at 10.)  In 
the Department’s view, all “compensation for performing 
work” qualifies as remuneration for employment (Answering 
Br. at 15), regardless of whether the payment is provided by a 
third party, and no statutory exemption applies to the 
Talisman Bonuses.   
 
We conclude that the District Court erred in 
determining that all payments relating to employment, 
regardless of their source, must be included in the regular rate 
                                                 
3  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345, as well as 29 U.S.C. § 217.  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment, and likewise over a district court’s 
interpretation of the FLSA.  Madison v. Res. for Human Dev., 
Inc., 233 F.3d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 2000).   
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of pay, absent a statutory exemption.  Instead, whether a 
payment qualifies as remuneration for employment depends 
on the employer’s and employee’s agreement.  Under the 
correct legal standard, and on the record before us, there is a 
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the efficiency 
and Pacesetter bonuses are remuneration for employment, so 
we will vacate in part the District Court’s judgment and 
remand for further consideration of those bonuses.4  But, we 
conclude that the safety bonus is remuneration for 
employment and is not subject to a statutory exemption, and 
thus we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as to that 
bonus. 
 
A. Incentive Bonuses Qualify as Remuneration 
 for Employment Only by Agreement. 
When interpreting a statute, we begin, of course, with 
the text.  Cazun v. Att’y Gen., 856 F.3d 249, 255 (3d Cir. 
2017).  If the statute’s text is unambiguous, our inquiry 
ceases.  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017).  To the 
extent the text may have multiple meanings, we must 
endeavor to discern Congress’s intent.  Susinno v. Work Out 
World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 
Here, the pertinent provision of the FLSA says that 
“the ‘regular rate’ at which an employee is employed shall be 
deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, 
                                                 
4  Because we need to remand, given that the 
efficiency and Pacesetter bonuses cannot at this stage be 
called remuneration for employment, we need not determine 
whether those payments qualify under the statute as exempt 
from inclusion in the regular rate of pay. 
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or on behalf of, the employee,” subject to certain statutory 
exceptions.  29 U.S.C. § 207(e).  But it does not define 
“remuneration for employment” or address payments from 
third parties to employees.   
 
The Department of Labor handles that silence by 
arguing that “there is a presumption that remuneration in any 
form is included in regular rate calculations.”  (Answering Br. 
at 9 (citations omitted).)  That argument begs the question.  
To say that all remuneration for employment is included in 
the “regular rate” does not answer whether a payment, in the 
first place, is remuneration for employment.5   
 
The Department of Labor also seems to argue that we 
should treat the Act’s silence on the meaning of 
“remuneration for employment” as proof that all sources of 
income should be treated the same when analyzing whether a 
payment qualifies as such remuneration.  That argument, 
though, ignores the understanding of the parties to the actual 
employment agreement.  The silence of the Act is better 
understood as evidence that Congress took it for granted that 
it was only regulating the employer–employee relationship, 
not re-writing that relationship to impose the effects of 
decisions made by third parties.  After all, the FLSA was 
drafted more than 80 years ago against a long-understood and 
still true principle: employment contracts are contracts and 
must be interpreted to reflect the agreement reached by the 
parties.  “Remuneration for employment” should therefore be 
                                                 
5  The Department is correct, however, that if a 
payment qualifies as remuneration for employment there is a 
presumption that such remuneration will be included in the 
“regular rate.”  See Madison, 233 F.3d at 187.  
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understood as being what the employer and the employee 
agreed would be paid for the job. 
 
There is, moreover, strong support in other provisions 
of the FLSA for the view that third-party payments should be 
viewed differently from those made by an employer.  The 
FLSA as originally passed contained no reference to any 
payments from third parties to employees.  Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060-69 (1938).  
In 1966, though, Congress amended the Act to allow tips 
received by employees to be counted by employers in 
determining whether they have fulfilled up to 50% of their 
minimum wage obligation.  Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 101(a), 80 
Stat. 830 (1966) (adding § 203(m) to 29 U.S.C. § 203).  Thus, 
the first time that Congress spoke about third-party payments, 
it allowed employers to count such payments – up to a point – 
for the purpose of the minimum wage requirement.  If such 
payments had already been understood in the law to be 
included in employees’ wages, that amendment would have 
been superfluous.  The 1966 amendment indicates the 
sensible legislative understanding that money given by a third 
party to an employee is not automatically remuneration for 
employment.  As the Supreme Court observed, “[t]he Fair 
Labor Standards Act is not intended to do away with tipping” 
and “not every gratuity given a worker by his employer’s 
customer is a part of his wages[,]” meaning, of course, the 
wages used to calculate the regular rate of pay.  Williams v. 
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 388, 404 (1942).  In 
1974, Congress clarified that tips could only be counted 
towards the minimum wage requirement if the “employee has 
been informed by the employer.”  Pub. L. No. 93-259, 
§ 13(e), 88 Stat. 65 (1974).  In other words, a third-party 
payment – tips – would be included in the regular rate of pay 
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if there was an understanding between employer and 
employee about the treatment of the third-party payment.   
 
At least one of the statutory exemptions to the 
overtime provisions gives further support to reading the 
FLSA as treating third-party payments differently.  That 
exemption excludes from the regular rate of pay any 
discretionary incentive bonuses paid by employers.  29 
U.S.C. § 207(e)(3) (exempting “[s]ums paid in recognition of 
services performed during a given period if … both the fact 
that payment is to be made and the amount of the payment are 
determined at the sole discretion of the employer at or near 
the end of the period and not pursuant to any prior contract, 
agreement, or promise causing the employee to expect such 
payments regularly”).  It seems unlikely that Congress 
intended to exempt discretionary payments from employers, 
but not such payments from customers. 
 
The guidance we have from the case law is also 
consistent with that view.  The Supreme Court has described 
the regular rate of an employee’s pay as a matter of 
agreement between the employer and the employee, saying, 
“[t]he regular rate by its very nature must reflect all payments 
which the parties have agreed shall be received regularly 
during the workweek, exclusive of overtime payments.”  
Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 
419, 424 (1945) (emphasis added).  That common-sense view 
has never before been challenged.     
 
Therefore, a rule that looks to the contracting parties’ 
understanding to determine whether a third-party payment 
(even if transferred to an employee by his employer) is 
remuneration for employment is the correct approach, as 
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opposed to the Department’s all-third-party-payments-are-
always-remuneration rule.  Both contracting parties are 
safeguarded by respecting their actual understanding.  Money 
that employers and employees have agreed – either explicitly 
or implicitly – is part of regular pay cannot be funneled 
through third parties to dodge overtime requirements, so 
employees are protected.  At the same time, employers are 
protected from being on the hook every time a third party 
chooses to add to an employee’s income.   
 
Two examples illustrate the latter point.  Take the case 
of a youngster on his first job.  Because his father wants him 
to excel and cares about the family’s reputation, he offers his 
son an extra five dollars every time the boy can show he 
successfully completed a certain number of assigned tasks at 
work.  Such a third-party payment gives an incentive to the 
youngster to perform well for his employer, but, even if the 
employer knew the father was providing his son with that 
bonus, it would simply be wrong to say that the extra pay 
should be considered remuneration for the boy’s work, unless 
this was part of the employment agreement.  Under the 
Department’s rule, however, the employer would be forced to 
include the father’s payment in the regular rate of pay, 
meaning that the father could cause the employer’s labor 
costs to increase, without the employer having any say in the 
matter.  A rule that focuses on what the parties agreed to, on 
the other hand, would exclude such payments and enable the 
employer to determine and limit its own labor costs.  And, as 
described above, nothing in the Act or the history of its 
enforcement indicates that such a bonus belongs in the regular 
rate of the son’s pay. 
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Next, consider a car service driver.  A regular 
passenger tells his driver that each time the driver is on time 
he will give the driver an extra ten dollars.  The passenger 
pays this by credit card, and the driver’s employer remits the 
regularized tip to the employee, as the law requires.  That 
incentive bonus arrangement clearly benefits the employee, 
and it arguably helps the employer too, as its customer is 
happier if the driver is on time.  But the mutuality of 
satisfaction with the bonus does not make it part of the 
employment agreement.  Again, the Department’s rule would 
allow the customer to unilaterally alter the employer’s labor 
costs, whereas a rule that focuses on the parties’ agreement 
would prevent the employer’s costs from being decided by 
the whims of an outsider.  
 
In short, in both the case of the youngster and the car 
service driver, looking to the parties’ agreement protects the 
employer from having to pay for a third party’s generous 
actions.  It does damage to the employment relationship to 
force employers to include promised bonuses from third 
parties as remuneration in the regular rate of pay, unless and 
until the evidence demonstrates that those bonuses have 
become part of the pay calculation agreed to in some fashion 
by the employer and employee.   
 
In like manner, respecting the contracting parties’ 
actual agreement protects the employee.  One can imagine a 
circumstance in which an employer tries to pressure an 
employee to accept remuneration from a third party so as to 
artificially suppress on paper what the employer and 
employee both regard as the regular rate of pay.  Such a 
manipulation would also occur if an employer tried to 
categorize a portion of what was base pay as instead being a 
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bonus.  The parties’ true agreement is what should matter, not 
labels.  See Youngerman–Reynolds Hardwood, 325 U.S. at 
424 (“[The regular rate] is not an arbitrary label chosen by the 
parties; it is an actual fact.”). 
 
This is not only a matter of common law, but also of 
common sense.6  It is axiomatic that a mutual assent is 
                                                 
6  As for common sense, we cite no less an authority 
than Clark W. Griswold.  In the classic movie National 
Lampoon’s Christmas Vacation, the plot revolves around 
Clark’s anxious anticipation of his Christmas bonus.  See 
National Lampoon’s Christmas Vacation (Warner Bros. 
1989) (Really, you should see it.).  When the regular bonus 
does not arrive and instead Clark receives a jelly-of-the-
month club membership, he berates his boss, saying, 
“Seventeen years with the company, I’ve gotten a Christmas 
bonus every year but this one.  You don’t want to give 
bonuses, fine.  But when people count on them as part of their 
salary, well[.]”  Id.  Unlike the Christmas lights on his house, 
Clark doesn’t seem to be overly bright, but he at least 
understands how a course of dealing can lead to an 
expectation that could be viewed as a meeting of the minds 
about remuneration for employment.  In other words, it is 
common sense that labels alone do not control.  And, of 
course, the required agreement between employer and 
employee need not be explicit.  It may be implied through an 
employer’s significantly facilitating regular compensation 
that reaches the employee.  Walling v. Richmond Screw 
Anchor Co., 154 F.2d 780, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1946).  Whether 
an agreement is fairly implied is discussed further herein.  See 
infra at II.B. 
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necessary to form a contract.  See 1 Samuel Williston & 
Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 4:1 
(4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2019) (recognizing that long-standing 
principle and noting that “the inquiry will focus not on the 
question of whether the subjective minds of the parties have 
met, but on whether their outward expression of assent is 
sufficient to form a contract”).  The FLSA naturally takes 
account of that.     
 
The Department of Labor views the situation 
differently.  It relies on three Wage and Hour Division 
Opinion Letters, a district court opinion, and the purpose of 
the FLSA to contend that “compensation for performing 
work” qualifies as remuneration for employment, regardless 
of whether the payment is provided by a third party and no 
agreement exists.  (Answering Br. at 15.)  But none of those 
authorities will bear the weight of the conclusion pressed by 
the Department.   
 
The three Wage and Hour Division Opinion Letters the 
Department of Labor relies on do not actually undercut the 
necessity of an agreement at all.  Two of the letters – one 
from 2005, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion 
Letter (July 5, 2005), and one from 1966, U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter (Nov. 16, 1966) 
(Answering Br. Add. B) – address programs in which retail 
employees could earn a bonus by selling a vendor’s products.  
In the scenarios those letters describe, a third party sponsored 
the bonuses in concert with the employer.  The sponsorship 
was effectively joint.7  Thus, the bonus payments could, given 
                                                 
7  Those programs addressed a vendor compensating 
retail employees under circumstances where the only 
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the specific facts of those cases, rightly be seen as part of the 
relevant employment agreements.  The third letter, another 
from the mid-60’s, covers a third-party payment from a taxi 
cab company to hotel doormen.  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage 
& Hour Div., Opinion Letter (May 25, 1967) (Answering Br. 
Add. A).  In that scenario, the hotel employees received 
regular monthly payments from the cab company and the 
employer actively advocated treating those payments as 
remuneration for employment.  See Walling v. Richmond 
Screw Anchor Co., 154 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(concluding that payments that were regularly and actually 
made and facilitated by the employer could qualify as 
remuneration for employment).  Significantly, the employer 
was seeking a determination from the Department of Labor 
that the third-party payments could be credited towards the 
employer’s minimum wage obligations.  In other words, the 
hotel embraced, rather than disputed, that the payments to the 
doormen were compensation for employment.  Facts like that 
matter. 
 
The district court case the Department of Labor relies 
on, Romano v. Site Acquisitions, LLC, is also unpersuasive for 
the position the Department has taken here.  No. 15-cv-384, 
2017 WL 2634643 (D.N.H. June 19, 2017).  First of all, the 
Department has enforced the FLSA for a very long time, yet 
it can only point to a single unreported district court opinion 
                                                                                                             
 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the programs were jointly 
sponsored.  Because in each instance the retailer controlled 
both the store and its employees, it had to have approved and 
actively participated in the program from the outset for the 
sponsorship program to function. 
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indicating that an incentive bonus from a third party could be 
included in employees’ remuneration for employment.  Id., at 
*8-9.  The near total absence of other authority is alone 
telling.  If, in eight decades, no court has said what the 
Department of Labor now asserts is the meaning of the 
statute, that interpretation is probably unsupported because it 
is unsupportable.   
 
Moreover, a careful reading of Romano lends little aid 
to the Department’s position.  Romano did not reach the 
conclusion that incentive bonuses are always remuneration 
for employment.  The court in that case held that an incentive 
bonus that AT&T gave a contractor’s employees, paid 
through the contractor, could be included when calculating 
the regular rate.  2017 WL 2634643, at *1-2, 4, 8-9.  But the 
court’s analysis focused on the statutory exemptions to 
overtime calculations and not on whether the payments were 
“remuneration for employment” in the first place.  Id. at *8-9.  
As the Department acknowledges, in Romano the employer 
did not argue that the payments were not remuneration for 
employment, only that they fit under an exemption.  Id.  In 
addition, the procedural posture of the case was a motion by 
the employer for summary judgment.  Id. at *8.  The court 
therefore only determined that the employer’s exemption-
based arguments in favor of summary judgment were 
insufficient.  The opinion went no further.8 
                                                 
8  The Department also cites to Mata v. Caring For You 
Home Health, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 867 (S.D. Tex. 2015), but 
that case is plainly inapposite.  In Mata, money from a state 
health program was used to pay employees’ bonuses, but the 
employer retained discretion to decide if the money would be 
given as a bonus or used for health insurance.  Id. at 876.  The 
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The Department of Labor also argues that its preferred 
definition of remuneration for employment “is reasonable in 
light of the purpose of the FLSA” and is supported by our 
Court’s long recognition of “the FLSA’s broad remedial 
purpose.” (Answering Br. at 29 (citations omitted).)  The 
statutory purpose that the Department focuses on is the 
protection of the “general well-being of workers.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 202(a).  But the FLSA also recognizes that protecting the 
“general well-being of workers” is to be done “without 
substantially curtailing employment or earning power.”  29 
U.S.C. § 202.  The Department completely ignores that 
statutory purpose, reflecting a very short-sighted 
understanding of worker well-being. 
 
Imposing unexpected costs on employers does not 
work to the long-term benefit of employees.  On the contrary, 
an employer’s costs can certainly have negative consequences 
for employees.  The Department’s preferred rule would 
encourage employers to stop allowing their employees to 
accept bonuses from third parties, lest the employer’s own 
labor costs increase.  If that predictable consequence ensues, 
employees will be denied extra income.  And, if some 
companies decide to swallow the risk and allow such 
bonuses, they will nevertheless have to deal with the 
                                                                                                             
 
court’s analysis only addressed whether the payments 
qualified under an exemption to § 207(e), since employees 
had been told “that they would receive the bonus as part of 
their wages” and there was little doubt the bonuses were 
agreed to serve as compensation for employment.  Id. at 875-
76.  
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increased labor costs in some way.  They will either increase 
their prices as they bid on jobs, or, to remain competitive, 
they will cut costs somewhere, perhaps by hiring fewer 
workers.  The challenge will be particularly felt by small 
businesses that can ill-afford to deal with the added expense 
and complexity imposed by the Department’s rule.  In the 
end, allowing third parties to unilaterally increase a 
company’s labor costs is likely to be bad for employees as 
well as employers.  For instance, here, had Bristol known that 
permitting the employees to qualify for the bonuses would 
increase its labor costs, perhaps it would have said no when 
the employees asked if they could accept them.  The 
Department thus is arguably not following the FLSA’s 
instruction to protect the “general well-being of workers[.]”  
Id.   
 
But even if the pain of the Department’s interpretation 
were only visited on employers, it is a “flawed premise” to 
think “that the FLSA pursues its remedial purpose at all 
costs.”  Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 
1142 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Indeed, “no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.”  
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per 
curiam).  “[A] fair reading” of the FLSA, neither narrow nor 
broad, is what is called for.  Encino Motorcars, 138 S. Ct. at 
1142.  And that is as should be expected, because employees’ 
rights are not the only ones at issue and, in fact, are not 
always separate from and at odds with their employers’ 
interests.   
 
In short, we reject the Department’s proposition that 
all third-party payments are to be considered remuneration for 
employment.  Instead, we conclude that a third-party payment 
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qualifies as remuneration for employment only when the 
employer and employee have effectively agreed it will.   
 
B. The Record Does Not Show That an Implicit 
 Agreement Existed That  All of the Talisman 
 Bonuses Were Remuneration for 
 Employment. 
Here, there was no explicit agreement between Bristol 
and its employees that the Talisman Bonuses would serve as 
remuneration for employment.  That, however, does not end 
our inquiry.  We must determine whether the record shows 
that there was an implicit agreement that those bonuses would 
be such remuneration.  See Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 
F.2d at 784-85 (explaining that the required agreement can be 
implied through facilitation of compensation regularly and 
actually reaching the employee); see also Jacksonville 
Terminal Co., 315 U.S. at 404 (noting that a conclusion that 
all tips are not included in the regular rate “does not foreclose 
a decision that in certain specific situations the so-called tips 
may be in reality the employee’s compensation for his 
services”).   
 
Whether an implicit agreement has developed between 
an employer and its employees that third-party bonuses are 
rightly regarded as “remuneration for employment” is a 
question that does not lend itself to an easy, bright-line test.  
It presents complexities best resolved by a holistic 
consideration of the particular facts of each case.  Before one 
tries to answer the ultimate legal question of how, from a 
regulatory standpoint, to treat a third-party bonus, there are 
some signs to look for in the factual record. 
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As a threshold matter, for a payment to become part of 
the employment agreement, it must be regularly and actually 
received by the employee.  Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 154 
F.2d at 784.  That is a necessary but not sufficient condition.  
That kind of course of dealing can give rise to a mutually 
understood level of compensation for specific work.  Because 
an employee cannot expect a bonus he does not know he is 
entitled to, the payment by a third party of an unannounced or 
truly discretionary bonus should not be classified as 
remuneration for employment.9  If, however, an employer 
                                                 
9  Our opinion should not be misunderstood as 
conflating “remuneration for employment” with a payment’s 
inclusion in the “regular rate.”  By statute, certain 
discretionary payments may be renumeration for employment 
yet not part of the regular rate.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(3) 
(exempting incentive bonus payments where the employer 
retains discretion over the amount and fact of payment until 
close to the time payment is made).  We are not, however, 
wrestling with whether one of the statutory exemptions 
applies to keep remuneration for employment out of the 
regular rate of pay.  We are considering here a related but 
different question: whether an implicit agreement has been 
reached between the employer and its employees about the 
treatment of third-party bonuses.  And we are suggesting at 
this point only that, if a third-party bonus is discretionary, that 
bonus cannot be legitimately expected by the employee and, 
therefore, cannot give rise to an implicit agreement between 
the employer and the employee that it constitutes 
remuneration for employment.  Cf. Balt. & O.R. Co. v. United 
States, 261 U.S. 592, 598 (1923) (“And so an agreement to 
pay for services rendered by the plaintiff will not be 
implied … when the plaintiff did not expect payment, or 
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regularly and predictably relies on a bonus to induce certain 
behavior, that would certainly be a significant factor in 
determining whether that regular bonus was remuneration for 
employment, even though the bonuses originated from a third 
party.10  And the more direct the employer’s involvement is in 
initiating a program or setting and insisting upon a specific 
payment from a third party, the clearer it becomes that the 
employer is invested in the arrangement in a way that could 
be called an implicit agreement with the employees that the 
                                                                                                             
 
under the circumstances did not have reason to entertain such 
expectation; [or] when the defendant understood that the 
plaintiff would neither expect nor demand remuneration[.]” 
(citations omitted)). 
 
10 Thus, if employees do not have a legitimate 
expectation that they will receive a particular bonus for 
achieving a particular result, such compensation would not be 
included in the regular rate.  (Cf. Oral Argument  
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/17-
3663SecretaryUSv.Bristol.%20.mp3 (“Oral Arg.”) at 24:38-
24:59 (argued Sept. 11, 2018) ([Counsel for Department of 
Labor]: “[I]f they have announced it in advance … such that 
the employees have an expectation that they are going to 
receive it and … it’s tied to a metric that’s … measurable and 
inducing the employees to work in a certain way, then, if it is 
in fact paid, then it is included in the regular rate.”); Oral Arg. 
at 25:57-26:10 ([Counsel for Department of Labor]: “[I]f they 
have left it completely subjective as to the amount and the 
fact of payment, then it is more discretionary, but that is not 
the same as a production bonus in the sense that employees 
… don’t know how much more do I have to work.”).)   
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third-party incentive bonuses are remuneration for 
employment.11  Cf. 1 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 4:1 (4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 
2019) (in asking whether parties have an agreement, the focus 
is on “their outward expression of assent”).  
 
Contrary to the Department’s argument, though, an 
implicit agreement does not arise between an employer and 
its employees simply because the employer permits its 
employees to participate in a third-party bonus program and 
does something to facilitate their receipt of the bonuses.  
                                                 
11 Considering the level of an employer’s involvement 
in the payment is consistent with the line the Department of 
Labor itself has drawn by directing employers to include 
service charges, even those paid by third parties, in overtime 
calculations.  See 29 C.F.R. § 531.55(a) (“A compulsory 
charge for service, such as 15 percent of the amount of the 
bill, imposed on a customer by an employer’s establishment, 
is not a tip and, even if distributed by the employer to its 
employees, cannot be counted as a tip[.]”).  Thus, tips are the 
property of the employee, while money received from 
mandatory service charges is always wages when given to the 
employee.  Id.  In contrast to a compulsory charge, a 
suggested gratuity might need to be included in remuneration 
for employment, but that decision is best left to the trier of 
fact.  See Bradescu v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. SACV 13-
1289, 2014 WL 5312546, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) 
(concluding that whether customers paying employer-
suggested but not employer-compelled gratuities for large 
parties qualified as “remuneration for employment” was a 
triable issue of fact). 
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Many employers permit their employees to receive payments 
from third parties and take minor steps to facilitate their 
employees’ receipt of those payments, without those 
payments qualifying as remuneration for employment, tips 
being the most obvious example.  Employers often act as a 
conduit, processing credit card receipts or otherwise passing 
through to their employees money coming from third parties.  
In establishments that allow tipping, that basic facilitation 
does not transform a tip into remuneration.  An employer has 
no choice but to promptly pass on such payments, or it risks 
committing tip theft.  29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(2)(B).  So an 
employer’s merely acting as an intermediary is not, without 
more, enough to make such payments remuneration for 
employment.12   
 
That does not mean that facilitation is irrelevant.  Far 
from it.  The deeper an employer gets into the creation, 
management, and payment of an incentive bonus program, 
the more those bonus payments begin to look like part of the 
                                                 
12  Despite the Department’s assertion, withholding of 
taxes on payments likewise does not transform an employer 
from an intermediary into something more.  An employer is 
legally required to collect taxes on tips, file tax forms relating 
to tips, and remit those taxes to the IRS.  26 C.F.R. 
§ 31.3402(k)-1.  Courts have similarly concluded, that even 
when public safety employers, such as police departments, 
remit payments through their payroll system and deduct taxes 
for “special detail work” performed by their employees for 
third parties, those payments should not be used to adjust the 
regular rate.  See, e.g., Lemieux v. City of Holyoke, 740 F. 
Supp. 2d 246, 256 (D. Mass. 2010); Nolan v. City of Chi., 125 
F. Supp. 2d 324, 336 (N.D. Ill. 2000).   
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regular pay structure to which the employer has agreed, and 
that is the ultimate question: has there been an assent by both 
the employer and the employees that the third-party bonuses 
are part of their employment agreement.   
 
To sum up, in order for a course of dealing to result in 
an implied agreement to treat third-party incentive bonuses as 
remuneration for employment, a fact finder should consider 
whether the specific requirements for receiving the payment 
are known by the employees in advance of their performing 
the relevant work; whether the payment itself is for a 
reasonably specific amount; and whether the employer’s 
facilitation of the payment is significantly more than serving 
as a pass through vehicle.  If the answer to all of those 
questions is yes, there should then be a holistic assessment of 
the level of the employer’s involvement in the third-party 
bonus program, to determine if it can fairly be said that the 
employer and employees have adopted the third-party 
incentive bonuses as part of their employment agreement.  
There may be other relevant considerations that arise from 
case to case, but an employer’s role in initiating, designing, 
and managing the incentive bonus program will likely be of 
high importance. 
 
In short, the question is whether there has been a 
course of dealing sufficient to characterize the payment as 
one that is legitimately expected by the employees and 
legitimately understood as being sponsored in a meaningful 
way by the employer.13  Cf., e.g., McLaughlin v. McGee Bros. 
                                                 
13  Without a legitimate expectation based on advanced 
notice, there is no basis for considering whether the bonus is 
an incentive.  Otherwise, the matter is simply too vague and 
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Co., 681 F. Supp. 1117, 1133 (W.D.N.C. 1988), aff’d sub 
nom. Brock v. Wendell’s Woodwork, Inc., 867 F.2d 196 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (noting that employer-given “incentive-type 
bonuses … given pursuant to an agreement or understanding 
as a reward for specific employee behavior … must be 
included in the regular rate” (emphasis added)).   
1. The Record Does Not Support Summary 
 Judgment that the  Efficiency and 
 Pacesetter Bonuses Are Remuneration 
 for Employment.   
Here, at least as to the efficiency and Pacesetter 
bonuses, the record shows there is reason to question whether 
employees knew the specific requirements to earn a set bonus 
in advance of performing the relevant tasks, so as to give rise 
to the requisite expectation.  This forecloses for now, at the 
summary judgment stage, a decision that those incentive 
bonuses are remuneration for employment.  It is possible that 
they were understood and expected by the employees as part 
of their job with Bristol, but it is also possible that the 
bonuses were not understood by the employees as 
                                                                                                             
 
generalized, and, as the Department acknowledges, “[e]very 
employee knows, ‘well if I work hard my employer is going 
to be happy.’”  (Oral Arg. at 26:12-26:15.)  The Department 
also acknowledges the importance of possessing that 
knowledge in advance in its brief, arguing that “the work 
requirements for receiving the bonuses … [were explained] 
before the employees performed the work for which they 
could earn the bonuses.”  (Answering Br. at 5.) 
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remuneration from Bristol at all but rather as a discretionary 
gratuity from Bristol’s customer.14 
 
The Department of Labor alleges that “Bristol … 
explained the program to its employees, including the 
requirements for receiving the bonuses” (Answering Br. at 18 
n.9), in advance of the employees’ performing the work.  And 
the Department offered some evidence regarding the 
Talisman Bonus program to support that allegation.  But the 
evidence is either disputed or not sufficient to show that 
Bristol’s employees were aware of the specific requirements 
to qualify for the bonuses, in advance of performing the 
work.15  For instance, while Bristol admitted that it explained 
                                                 
14  The District Court found that it was not disputed 
that “[the employees] knew the terms for earning each 
bonus.”  (App. at 3.)  But whether the employees knew the 
terms of the bonus is a distinct question from whether the 
employees knew those terms in advance of performing work.  
Moreover, knowing the general terms is different than 
knowing the specific terms, and the District Court itself said 
that “Talisman retained sole discretion” while “Bristol did not 
have discretion” over the bonuses.  (App. at 3, 9.)  Bristol’s 
lack of control and knowledge is not dispositive of whether 
an agreement was in place, but it is enough to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether it could have even 
communicated the specific terms of the bonus to its 
employees. 
 
15  The Department states that “bonuses were promised 
to be paid upon the occurrence of certain events[,]” 
(Answering Br. at 11,) but the Department points to nothing 
in the record to support that contention, and we could find no 
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the process for claiming the bonuses to its employees, it did 
not admit to explaining the process for earning them.16 
 Specificity matters.  While employees may have been aware, 
prior to performing their daily duties, that job performance 
could lead to a bonus, the record suggests that Bristol’s 
employees may not have been aware of the specific 
requirements to earn a bonus.17  And some evidence indicates 
                                                                                                             
 
evidence supporting it.  The Department asserted that, 
“[d]uring the [Talisman] meetings, the … operators would 
also be shown charts explaining why a hole was or was not 
eligible for a bonus.”  (Pl.’s Facts D.I. 19-1 at 5-6 ¶ 21.)  And, 
Bristol generally agreed that “[i]nformation pertaining to the 
bonuses and whether [the employees] had qualified for a 
bonus for a particular hole was made available to [employees] 
at the safety meetings.”  (Def. Res. to Pl.’s Facts D.I. 21 at 
18.)  But informing employees that they are “eligible” or 
“qualified” for a bonus after the fact is not the same as 
informing an employee in advance about the conduct needed 
to earn those bonuses.  Employees knowing that certain 
behavior could lead to a bonus is not the same as employees 
knowing it would lead to a bonus. 
 
16 The Department asserts that “Bristol explained to the 
… operators the requirements for receiving the bonuses 
before they performed the work and started receiving the 
bonuses.”  (Pl.’s Facts D.I. 19-1 at 4 ¶ 15.)  But Bristol denied 
that allegation.  Bristol admitted that it explained the process 
to claim bonuses but not how to earn them.    
 
17  For example, one Bristol employee spoke about 
“know[ing] that it’s a possibility that we can achieve it,” and 
29 
 
that Talisman, not Bristol, communicated the terms of the 
bonus program to Bristol’s employees – and may have done 
so after those employees performed their work, as opposed to 
before.18   
 
Moreover, since Talisman had complete discretion to 
change the amount of the bonuses it offered or the specific 
                                                                                                             
 
spoke about the criteria being based on “perform[ing] very 
well” – a very subjective, not objective, criteria.  (App. at 190 
(emphasis added).)  Another employee indicated a general 
awareness of the bonuses before performing work, but he did 
not have any knowledge about the specific requirements to 
earn any bonus except the safety bonus.  While one employee 
did state that the bonuses were common knowledge known 
before performing work, he also stated that the charts were 
“just handed around to see if you got it and if you got it, fine, 
if you didn’t, it would show a chart on why you didn’t[,]” 
indicating the charts were not telling employees what they 
needed to do but, instead, what they had done.  (App. at 168.)  
Statements like those are enough to create a genuine dispute 
about whether the Pacesetter and efficiency bonuses were 
incentive bonuses. 
 
18  (See App. at 187 (“Talisman … issued out a paper 
in all of our safety meetings … and it would tell us everything 
that we achieved and the amount of money that we would be 
getting[.]); App. at 184 (“Like, they would give us a paper 
after every well and let us know what we got.” (emphasis 
added)); Def. Facts D.I. 23-2 at 8 ¶ 28 (noting Bristol was 
“not [even] sure what Talisman’s criteria were when deciding 
to pay an [efficiency] bonus or a pace setter bonus.”).) 
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requirements to earn them, and could decide at any time to 
cancel the bonus program, it is unclear as a matter of fact that 
Bristol employees could have a legitimate expectation of 
receiving a given amount for completing a task.  One 
employee even described the Talisman Bonuses being given 
out of “appreciation[,]” not to induce striving for known 
benchmarks.  (App. at 190.)  On the record as it now stands, 
we cannot definitively say there was a course of dealing 
sufficient to give rise to an implicit agreement. 
 
The Department of Labor argued in the District Court 
that “[i]t would, of course, make little sense to institute 
performance bonuses without telling employees about them in 
advance.”  (D.I. 21 at 18 (citation omitted).)  That assertion 
may or may not be accurate, but this much is certainly true: a 
moving party cannot prevail on summary judgment by 
arguing an inference in its own favor.  Every reasonable 
inference is to be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor, 
Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 660 (2014), and the record 
here contains enough evidence to permit the reasonable 
conclusion that Bristol employees did not have the kind of 
information that would give them a legitimate expectation of 
a specific payout for specific performance.   
 
Looking more particularly at evidence pertaining to the 
efficiency and Pacesetter bonuses, Bristol acknowledged that 
“the [efficiency] bonus was paid for getting the hole drilled 
faster than the days Talisman had anticipated for drilling the 
hole, and the pace setter bonus was paid for drilling deeper on 
any given day than Talisman had anticipated[,]” (D.I. 23-2 at 
8 ¶ 29), but that is not sufficiently specific.  “Faster” and 
“deeper” are subjective criteria unless a benchmark is given.  
There is no evidence showing employees knew in advance 
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what drilling faster or deeper meant.19  And nowhere in the 
record is there even an allegation of how much compensation 
the efficiency bonus would yield.20  While one employee 
testified that the bonuses were “guaranteed every time [and 
were for] the same amount of money” (App. at 190), the same 
employee also indicated the amount of compensation 
employees earned was not shared with employees until after 
the fact.  Regardless of the degree of Bristol’s involvement in 
the bonus program, then, there remains the question of 
whether the course of dealing was long enough and consistent 
enough to amount to an implicit agreement that the bonuses 
would serve as remuneration for employment.   
 
Therefore, summary judgment was not warranted for 
the efficiency and Pacesetter bonuses, and we will vacate the 
District Court’s order with respect to those payments.   
 
2. The Safety Bonus Qualifies as 
 Remuneration for Employment. 
 
                                                 
19  In fact, at oral argument the Department of Labor 
could not point to a single place in the record that indicated 
either the Pacesetter or efficiency bonuses were based on 
objective metrics.  (Oral Arg. at 21:50-22:00.)  
 
20  There is a reference in the record to a Pacesetter 
bonus being $500, but it is not clear that it was always $500.  
As noted by the District Court, “[o]ver the course of this 
working relationship, Talisman changed the amount of the 
bonus at its leisure.”  (App. at 3.) 
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In contrast, the record does adequately establish that 
the safety bonus was remuneration for employment.21  The 
parties do not dispute that Bristol employees knew the 
specific conduct necessary to earn it – the safety bonus was 
attained if there were no accidents or injuries during the job.  
Employees did not have to be briefed daily in order to clearly 
know the specific conduct required to earn the bonus and 
have an expectation of receiving it.  Employees also knew the 
specific compensation they would receive.  The amount of the 
safety bonus was always the “daily bonus rate of $20 or $25.”  
(D.I. 19-1 at 5 ¶ 19.)  Thus, regardless of whether employees 
were told daily that they would receive the safety bonus if 
they met its requirements, there is little doubt they knew the 
specific conduct required to earn a specific sum and had an 
expectation of receiving it for doing what was required.  It is 
also undisputed that Bristol’s facilitation of the program went 
significantly beyond merely acting as a pass-through.     
 
Bristol reached out to Talisman to ask if its employees 
could participate in the bonus program.  Bristol tracked which 
of its employees earned a bonus and reported that information 
to Talisman.  Bristol regularly invoiced Talisman for payment 
on behalf of its employees.  And finally, Bristol concedes that 
it was responsible for getting those invoices approved by 
lower level Talisman employees and “sending the information 
to Talisman’s contracted invoice processor.”  (Opening Br. at 
3.)  Bristol also collected a “a reasonable processing fee” for 
its efforts.  That level of involvement is enough to support the 
conclusion that Bristol effectively adopted Talisman’s bonus 
                                                 
21  We can affirm the District Court on any grounds.  
Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
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program and implicitly agreed to make it part of the 
employment agreement with its employees.22    
 
On this record, therefore, the safety bonus is 
remuneration for employment.  And, because the safety bonus 
does not qualify under any of the statutory exemptions,23 it 
                                                 
22  The same may be true as to the efficiency and 
Pacesetter bonuses, but we leave consideration of a more 
developed factual record to the District Court in the first 
instance. 
 
23  Recall that the FLSA provides eight enumerated 
exemptions to the requirement that all remuneration for 
employment be included in the “regular rate” for overtime 
purposes.  29 U.S.C. § 207(e).  The employer bears the 
burden of establishing the applicability of an exemption.  
Madison, 233 F.3d at 183.     
Before the District Court, Bristol argued that the 
bonuses should qualify under three possible exemptions: 
“bonus payments as gifts; payments made for occasional 
periods when no work is performed; and payments paid for 
services, without prior agreement, where discretionary 
payment in fact and amount is retained by the employer.”  
(App. at 5-6 (citing U.S.C. § 207(e)(1)-(3)).)   
Bristol did not raise in its opening brief the arguments 
that the bonuses should qualify for the exemption for gifts or 
occasional periods when no work is performed.  As a result, 
we need not consider those arguments now.  Hoxworth v. 
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 204-05 n.29 (3d 
Cir.1990).  Even if we did, however, it would be a painful 
stretch to say that the safety bonus qualifies under those 
exemptions.  Gifts are defined to include “payments in the 
nature of gifts made at Christmas time or on other special 
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should be included in the “regular rate” of pay for those 
Bristol employees who have been earning that bonus.   
 
III. CONCLUSION 
  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment in part, vacate it in part, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
occasions,” 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(1), and the safety bonus was 
not reserved for special occasions.  The exemption for 
“payments made for occasional periods when no work is 
performed” requires that work is not performed, but here 
bonuses were achieved by working at the Talisman sites.  Id. 
§ 207(e)(2). 
The only exemption Bristol alludes to in its opening 
brief is the exemption for bonuses where the employer retains 
discretion.  Id. § 207(e)(3).  But here, the safety bonus was 
regularly paid, and to qualify as a discretionary bonus such a 
bonus must be paid without “any prior contract, agreement, or 
promise causing the employee to expect such payments 
regularly[.]”  Id.  The record shows there was a legitimate 
expectation with respect to the safety bonus. 
 
 
